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HENRY THORNTON: 
SEMINAL  MONETARY THEORIST AND 
FATHER OF THE MODERN CENTRAL BANK 
1.  Introduction 
In  1802,  Henry  Thornton 
published  the  book  An  Enqky 
into the Nature and  Efects  of the 
Paper  Credit  of  Great Brtitain.  ’ 
On  the  basis of this work,  Thorn- 
ton  deserves  the  title  of “Father 
of  Modern  Central  Banking.” 
Thornton  developed  the  idea  of 
a central  bank  that  could  control 
the  monetary  base  as  a  book- 
keeping  operation.  Through  con- 
trol  of the  base,  the  central  bank 
could  control  the  money  stock  of 
the  entire  country.  Finally, 
through  control  of  the  money 
stock,  the  central  bank  could  con- 
trol  the  price  level.  A key  theme 
of Paper Credit is the  importance 
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of  explicit  acceptance  by  the  central  bank  of  its 
responsibility  for  determining  the  price  level.  Not 
until Keynes’ A Tract  on  Monetary  Rejmn is there  again 
such  a forceful  statement  of the  concept  of a modern 
central  bank. 
In  18 10,  Thornton  repeated  these  ideas  in  the 
Bzdhm  Repwt. Although  this report  was written  jointly 
by  Horner,  Huskisson,  and Thornton,  the  analytical 
framework  used  is Thornton’s.  The  BukJion  Report 
is reviewed  in  the  final  sections  of  this  article  as  a 
way  of showing  the  use which  Thornton  made  of the 
analytical  apparatus  he  developed  in  Paper Credit. 
Thornton  analyzed  the  paper  money  standard  that 
existed  in Britain  after  suspension  of the  international 
This  paper  was  written  on  the  occasion  of the  75th  birthday 
of  Milton  Friedman,  July  31,  1987. 
1 Page  references  are to the  Hayek  edition,  which  includes  Paper 
Credit,  two  speeches  Thornton  made  before  Parliament  in May 
18 11, and  a biographical  sketch  of Thornton  by  Hayek.  Pages 
are  indicated  by  (H,  page  -).  The  page  citations  in  the  paper 
(C,  page  -)  are  to  the  Cannan  edition  of  the  Bullion  Report. 
gold  standard  in  1797.  For  this 
fiat  money  regime,  Thornton 
constructed  a general  equilibrium 
model  capable  of  explaining  the 
relationship  between  the  do- 
mestic  price  level  and  the  ex- 
change  rate  and  capable  of 
explaining  movements  in the  ex- 
change  rate  either  as  a  real 
phenomenon  or  a  monetary 
phenomenon.  The  chief  oper- 
ating  variable  of  the  Bank  of 
England  was  the  discount  rate. 
Thornton  developed  an  exposi- 
tion  of  the  quantity  theory 
organized  around  the  differing 
role  of  the  interest  rate  in  the 
supply  and demand  schedules  for 
the  money  stock.  As a condition 
for maintaining  a stable  monetary 
base  and money  stock,  the  supply  schedule  required 
the  central  bank  to keep  the  discount  rate  in line with 
the  economy’s  natural  rate  of  interest  either  by 
rationing  explicitly  its  discounts  or  by  targeting  a 
nominal  variable  like  the  exchange  rate. 
On  the  basis  of  the  contributions  in  this  book, 
Thornton  deserves  to be  ranked  among  the  foremost 
monetary  theorists  of  all times.  Only  a small  num- 
ber  of  economists,  however,  are  aware  of  his  con- 
tributions.  There  are  two  reasons  for  this  lack  of 
recognition. 
First,  Thornton  organized  his  economic  analysis 
around  the  central  proposition  that  with  a noncom- 
modity  monetary  standard  based  on  the  fiduciary 
issue  of  banks  a central  bank  must  assume  explicit 
control  over  its own  liabilities  (the  monetary  base). 
This  control  is necessary  in  order  to  maintain  the 
money  stock  and  to  maintain  a well-defined  price 
level.  When  the  international  gold  standard  became 
enshrined  as monetary  orthodoxy  in the  last  half  of 
the  nineteenth  century,  the  idea  of  a central  bank 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  3 exercising  explicit  control  over  the  monetary  base 
became  only  a theoretical  curiosum.  Under  the  in- 
ternational  gold  standard,  the  balance  of payments, 
not  the  behavior  of the  central  bank,  was  supposed 
to  determine  the  monetary  base  and  the  nominal 
quantity  of  money.  As  a consequence,  Thornton’s 
work  was  ignored  by  neoclassical  economists.2 
The  second  reason  for the  obscurity  of Thornton’s 
work  is Thornton’s  own  style  of exposition.  The  ideas 
in  Paper  Credat are  exposited  according  to  the 
chronological  order  in which  Thornton  dealt  with par- 
ticular problems  of policy,  rather  than  being  exposited 
in  a  way  designed  to  elucidate  the  underlying 
analytical  framework.  More  important,  this  under- 
lying framework  is nowhere  succinctly  presented,  but 
is submerged  in a great  mass  of  institutional  detail. 
In his review  of Paper Cmdit  in the  Edinbuqh  Rex&w, 
Francis  Horner  (1802,  p.  29)  states:  “But the  various 
discussions  are so unskilfully  arranged  that  they  throw 
no  light  on  each  other,  and  we  can  never  seize  a full 
view  of  the  plan.  . . .” Later  economists  reviewing 
the  monetary  debates  at the  beginning  of  the  nine- 
teenth  century  turned  to  David  Ricardo.  Ricardo’s 
quantity  theory  framework  was only  a caricature  com- 
pared  to Thornton’s,  but  the  clarity  and  forcefulness 
with  which  Ricardo  exposited  his  framework  made 
him,  rather  than  Thornton,  the  more  accessible 
author. 
Thornton’s  work  is discussed  in some  of the  classic 
works  in economics,  Viner  (1924)  discovered  Thorn- 
ton  and  discussed  his  contribution  to  the  theory  of 
international  trade.  Later,  Viner  ( 193 7) also discussed 
Thornton  in  the  context  of  the  bullionist-anti- 
bullionist  controversy.  Hayek  (193 1) was interested 
in  Thornton  because  of  the  latter’s  concept  of  a 
modern  central  bank  that  can  control  the  monetary 
base  and the  money  stock.  In his introduction  to the 
reprint  of  Paper  Credit,  Hayek  carefully  lists  the 
seminal  ideas  of  Thornton.  Another  such  list  is in 
Hutchison  (1968).  Mints  (1945)  reviews  Thornton’s 
criticisms  of  the  real  bills  principle.  Schumpeter 
(1954)  insightfully  notes  the  relationship  between 
Thornton’s  and  Wicksell’s  views  of credit  creation. 
[See  also  Humphrey  (19&S).)  Despite  these  discus- 
sions,  there  remains  a need  for  an  overview  of  the 
analytical  framework  employed  by  Thornton.  This 
essay  is motivated  by the  belief  that  the  major  reason 
for  the  current  lack  of  appreciation  of Thornton  is 
the  absence  from  the  literature  of a comprehensive 
2 The  work  of  the  classical  economists  was  known  to  the 
neoclassical  economists  primarily  through  the  writings  of 
Ricardo  and  throueh  1. S.  Mill’s  Prink~les of Pohical  Economv. 
Mill  mentions  Th%on  only  in  the  contex;  of a discussion  of 
the  origin  of  bills  of  exchange. 
overview  of  the  general  equilibrium  model  of  the 
economy  developed  by  Thornton. 
Section  2  presents  some  of  the  historical 
background  to Thornton’s  work.  Section  3 explains 
Thornton’s  goal of extending  the  quantity  theory  to 
include  not  only  specie,  but  also  money  created 
through  credit  extension.  Section  4 discusses  Thorn- 
ton’s  theory  of  money  demand.  As  background  to 
Thornton’s  theory  of  money  supply,  Section  5 
discusses  the  natural  rate  hypothesis  built  into 
Thornton’s  theory  of aggregate  supply  and demand. 
Section  6  discusses  Thornton’s  theory  of  money 
supply.  Section  7 presents  Thornton’s  criticisms  of 
the  real  bills  view.  Section  8  contains  Thornton’s 
discussion  of the  monetary  consequences  of the  in- 
ternational  adjustment  mechanism.  Section  9, which 
begins  the  discussion  of the  Bullion Report  reviews 
the  antibullionist  views  of the  Governors  of the  Bank 
of England  who  testified  before  the  Bullion  Commit- 
tee.  It  also  presents  the  rebuttal  of  these  views  by 
the  bullionists.  Section  10 contains  the  recommen- 
dations  of  the  Bullion  Committee  about  the  ap- 
propriate  policy  for the  Bank  of England.  Section  11 
contains  a  summary  of  the  article,  and  Section  12 
discusses  the  relevance  of  issues  raised  by  Thorn- 
ton  for  modern  central  banks. 
2.  Historical  Background3 
Hayek  notes  that  “Since  the  contributions  of 
Cantillon,  Galiani,  and  Hume  in  the  middle  of  the 
eighteenth  century  little  progress  had  been  made  in 
monetary  science.  . . . And  the  treatment  of money 
in  the  U4al.t.h  of Nations, which  dominated  opinion 
on  these  matters  in the  last  quarter  of the  century, 
contains  comparatively  little  of theoretical  interest” 
(H,  37).4  Toward  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury,  however,  significant  changes  in institutional  ar- 
rangements  prompted  an  interest  in  issues  of 
monetary  policy.  The  number  of country  banks  in- 
creased  rapidly,  and  the  Bank  of  England  became 
the  sole  issuer  of bank  notes  in London.  In  1797  in 
testimony  before  Parliament,  Francis  Baring,  in 
characterizing  the  Bank  of England,  first used  the  ex- 
pression  bank  of  dernier  resort  (last  resort).  The 
financial  panic  of  1793  and  the  ensuing  increased  de- 
mand  for  Bank  of England  notes  encouraged  reflec- 
tion  on  the  special  role  of that  bank  in the  banking 
system.  The  war with  France,  which  began  in  1793, 
3 The  first  two  paragraphs  and  the  last  paragraph  of  this 
section  draw  on  Hayek’s  introduction  to  Paper Cndk 
4  Humphrey  (1981),  however,  argues  that  this  view  must  be 
qualified  by  recognizing  Smith  as advocating  the  view now  known 
as  the  monetary  approach  to  the  balance  of  payments. 
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the  gold  standard.  Gold  was sent  out  of England  due 
to British financial  support  of its continental  army  and 
allies.  Also,  the  return  of  France  to  the  gold  stan- 
dard under  Napoleon  increased  the  demand  for gold. 
Finally,  in 1797, fear of a French  invasion precipitated 
a run  on  the  gold  reserves  of the  Bank  of England. 
This  run led the  Bank of England  to suspend  redemp- 
tion  of  its  notes  in  gold. 
At  first,  the  experiment  with  a  noncommodity 
money  standard  went  well.  There  was little  inflation 
or  depreciation  of  the  pound  on  the  foreign  ex- 
changes.  Gold  flowed  into  England  and  the  Bank  of 
England  replenished  its  reserves.  The  situation 
deteriorated  beginning  in  1800,  however.  Borrow- 
ing  by  the  British  government  from  the  Bank  in- 
creased.  Domestic  prices  began  to  rise  and  the 
pound  depreciated  on the  foreign  exchanges.  Because 
Napoleonic  Europe  was  on  the  gold  standard,  the 
pound  price  of  gold  bullion  measured  the  foreign 
exchange  value  of  the  pound.  In  1800,  the  pound 
price  of bullion  rose  to a value  ten  percent  in excess 
of the  old  mint  price  under  convertibility.  The  rise 
in the  market  price  of gold  over  the  old  mint  price 
prompted  criticism  of  the  Bank  of  England  for 
having  suspended  convertibility. 
This  historical  chronology  explains  the  organiza- 
tion  of  Paper Creda’t.  Thornton  deals  first  with  the 
appropriate  response  of  the  Bank  of  England  to  an 
internal  drain  that  produces  a  financial  panic.  He 
views  this  problem  not  just  in  terms  of  bank  runs, 
but  also in terms  of an increase  in the  precautionary 
demand  for money.  Thornton  elaborates  a sophisti- 
cated  theory  of the  demand  for  money  that  first  ex- 
plains the way in which  credit  creation  leads to money 
creation  in a fractional  reserve  system  and then  relates 
the  velocity  of the  various  components  of money  to 
the  difference  between  the  market  rate  of  interest 
and the  own  rate  on the  various  components.  Thorn- 
ton  defends  the  suspension  of cash  payments  by the 
Bank  of  England  in  1797  as necessary  in  order  to 
prevent  a contraction  of  the  money  stock  and  the 
associated  adverse  consequences  for  real  economic 
activity. 
In  the  last  part  of  his  book,  Thornton  considers 
the  key  dispute  between  the  bullionists  and  anti- 
bullionists.  He  considers  the  dispute  over  whether 
the  depreciation  of  the  pound  on  the  foreign  ex- 
changes  that  began  after  1800  was  caused  by  an 
adverse  movement  in the  commodity  terms  of trade 
or  currency  overissue  by  the  Bank  of  England.  In 
order  to  consider  this  dispute,  Thornton  constructs 
an analytical  apparatus  general  enough  to explain  both 
nominal  and  real  movements  of the  exchange  rate. 
In showing  how  an increase  in the  money  stock  can 
lead to a rise in the price  level  and a fall in the  nominal 
exchange  rate,  Thornton  elucidates  the  interaction 
between  the  central  bank’s  discount  rate,  the 
economy’s  natural  rate  of interest,  money  creation, 
and  the  foreign  exchange  value  of the  pound.  This 
discussion  also  contains  an  elaboration  of  a natural 
rate  hypothesis  to  reconcile  the  short-run  nonneu- 
trality  of money  with  long-run  neutrality.  Thornton 
uses  his  analytical  apparatus  to  advance  his  central 
theme  “that  the  restriction  of the  paper  of the  Bank 
of England  is the  means  both  of maintaining  its own 
value  and  of  maintaining  the  value,  as  well  as 
of  limiting  the  quantity,  of  all  the  paper  in  the 
country”  (H,  225). 
In  Paper  Credit, the  main  practical  concern  of 
Thornton  had  been  disruption  of economic  activity 
from  deflation,  produced  from  maintenance  of  the 
international  gold  standard  at a time  of bank  runs  or 
a deterioration  in the  terms  of trade.  In  the  decade 
after  the  publication  of Paper Cmdit, events  caused 
his main  concern  to shift to inflation  due  to overissue 
by central  banks.  In one  of his speeches  before  Parlia- 
ment  in  18 11, Thornton  says,  “Indeed,  in all parts 
of  Europe,  Hamburgh,  Amsterdam,  and  Paris  ex- 
cepted,  the  principle  of  a standard  seemed  to  have 
been  lost;  a suspension  of cash  payments  had  every 
where  taken  place;  and  [the]  paper  had  been  issued 
to excess,  and  had  also been  depreciated”  (H,  342). 
Thornton  refers  in particular  to  the  experiences  of 
Sweden,  Austria,  and  Portugal,  as well as the  earlier 
experience  of Russia.  As a member  of Parliament’s 
Committee  on  the  Irish  Currency,  Thornton  had  a 
firsthand  view of the  overissue  of the  Bank of Ireland, 
which  had suspended  cash payments  at the  same time 
as the  Bank of England.  In England,  the  market  price 
of bullion  remained  fairly  close  to its old parity  price 
from  1804  through  1808.  Beginning  in  1809, 
however,  the  pound  price  of  foreign  exchange  and 
bullion  rose  about  30  percent  above  the  old  parity. 
In  1801,  the  depreciation  had  been  limited  to  10 
percent. 
In  18 10, against  a background  of rising prices  and 
a falling  price  of the  pound  in the  foreign  exchange 
markets,  Francis  Horner  moved  before  Parliament 
that  a  Select  Committee  be  “appointed  to  enquire 
into  the  Cause  of  the  High  Price  of  Gold  Bullion, 
and to take  into  consideration  the  State  of the  Circu- 
lating  Medium  and of the  Exchanges  between  Great 
Britain  and  Foreign  Parts.”  The  resulting  Bullion 
Committee  Report  was drafted  by  Horner,  Huskis- 
son,  and  Thornton.  Its  major  recommendation  was 
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enforce  . . . a due  Limitation  of the  Paper  of the  Bank 
of  England,  as well  as  of  all the  other  Bank  Paper 
of the  Country.  . . .” (C,  Resolutions,  10) Thornton 
delivered  two  speeches,  later  issued  as pamphlets, 
during  the  debate  over  the  Bullion  Committee 
Report.  In  these  speeches,  he  repeats  his  model  of 
credit  and  money  stock  determination,  which  turns 
on the  difference  between  the  Bank  discount  rate  and 
the  natural  rate  of  interest.  This  time  he  supple- 
mented  his model  with  an explanation  of the  natural 
rate  of  interest  as the  sum  of  a real  rate  of  interest 
and  a liquidity  premium  dependent  upon  expected 
inflation. 
3.  Relationship  between  Credit  Creation  and 
Money  Creation 
Thornton  extended  the  analytical  apparatus  of the 
quantity  theory  to  money  created  through  credit 
extension.  In modern  jargon,  he  extended  the  quan- 
tity  theory  to  include  not  only  outside  money  (the 
monetary  base),  but  also inside  money  (the  fiduciary 
issue  of  banks  minus  their  reserves). 
Paper  constitutes,  it is true,  an  article  on  the  credit  side  of 
the  books  of some  men;  but  it forms  an exactly  equal  item 
on  the  debit  side  of  the  books  of  others.  It  constitutes, 
therefore,  on  the  whole,  neither  a  debit  or  a credit.  .  .  . 
The  case  of  gold,  on  the  other  hand,  differs  from  that  of 
paper  inasmuch  as  the  possessor  of  gold  takes  credit  for 
that  which  no  man  debits  himself.  (H,  79) 
Thornton  uses  the  term  “paper  credit”  for  inside 
money.  The  incentive  for  fiduciary  issue,  the  issue 
of paper  money,  came  from  economizing  on the  real 
resource  costs  of  a commodity  money. 
When  confidence  rises  to  a certain  height  in  a country,  it 
occurs  to  some  persons  that  profit  may  be  obtained  by 
issuing  notes,  which  purport  to  be  exchangeable  for 
money;  and  which,  through  the  known  facility  of  thus  ex- 
changing  them,  may  circulate  in  its  stead;  a part  only  of 
the  money,  of  which  the  notes  supply  the  place,  being 
kept  in  store  as  a  provision  for  the  current  payments. 
On  the  remainder  interest  is  gained,  and  this  interest 
constitutes  the  profit  of  the  issuer.  (H,  90) 
Thornton  was  the  first  economist  to  assert  that 
checking  accounts  formed  part  of the  money  stock. 
It  is  in  substance  the  same  thing  whether  a  person  de- 
posits  100  pounds  in  money  with  the  bank,  taking  no 
note,  but  obtaining  a  right  to  draw  a  draft  on  a  banking 
account  which  is  opened  in  his  name,  or  whether  he  de- 
posits  the  same  100  pounds  and  receives  for  it  a  bank 
note.  (H,  134) 
There  were  a  few  economists  in  the  nineteenth 
century  who  viewed  checking  accounts  as money, 
Torrens  and  Joplin,  for  example,  and  some 
economists  in  the  banking  school  tradition.  It  was 
not  until  the  192Os,  however,  that  economists 
working  in  the  quantity  theory  tradition  generally 
accepted  these  accounts  as money.  Unlike  most  other 
nineteenth  century  economists,  Thornton  was  able 
to  abstract  from  the  legal  distinctions  distinguishing 
gold  from  fiduciary  instruments  embodying  a claim 
to  gold  [Schumpeter  (1954),  7 171. He  successfully 
integrated  into  his  view  of  money  all media  of  ex- 
change  based  on  credit  creation. 
In  expanding  the  definition  of  money  to  instru- 
ments  derived  from  credit  extension,  Thornton  con- 
tinually  insists  on the  difference  between  the  demand 
for  money  and  the  demand  for  credit. 
. . . it  is  by  the  amount  not  of  the  loans  of  the  Bank  of 
England,  but  of  its  paper  .  .  . that  we  are  to  estimate  the 
influence  on  the  cost  of  commodities.  (H,  271) 
In  applying  the  quantity  theory  to  a  monetary 
regime  of paper  money,  Thornton  begins  with  the 
distinction  between  relative  prices  and the  price  level. 
It is only  with  respect  to  the  latter  concept  that  the 
supply  and  demand  analysis  of  the  quantity  theory 
is  applicable. 
. . . the  price  at  which  the  exchange  (or  sale)  takes  place 
depends  on  two  facts;  on  the  proportion  between  the 
supply  of  the  particular  commodity  and  the  demand  for 
it,  which  is  one  question;  and  on  the  proportion,  also, 
between  the  state  of  the  general  supply  of  the  general 
circulating  medium  and  that  of  the  demand  for it,  which 
is  another.  (H,  194) 
4.  The  Demand  for  Money 
According  to  Thornton,  the  demand  for  money 
includes  both  a  transactions  and  a  precautionary 
demand. 
The  supply  of  bank  notes  which  he  chuses  to  reserve  in 
his  drawer  is  always  estimated  by  the  scale  of  his  pay- 
ments;  or,  to  speak  more  correctly,  by  the  probable 
amount  of  the  fluctuations  in  his  stock  of  notes,  which 
fluctuations  are  proportionate,  or  nearly  proportionate,  to 
the  scale  of  his  payments.  (II,  234-35) 
Now  a high  state  of  confidence  contributes  to  make  men 
provide  less  amply  against  contingencies.  .  .  . When,  on 
the  contrary,  a  season  of  distrust  arises,  prudence  sug-, 
gests  that  the  loss  of  interest  arising  from  a  detention  of 
notes  for  a  few  additional  days  should  not  be  regarded. 
(H,  96-97) 
Thornton  thought  that  increases  in the  precautionary 
demand  for  money  acted  to  exacerbate  financial 
panics.  It  is interesting  to  note  in this  respect  that 
he  criticizes  the  common  notion  of  hoarding  as an 
unsophisticated  expression  of the  precautionary  de- 
mand  for  money. 
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money  of  the  country  in  some  measure  disappears,  the 
guineas,  it  is  commonly  said,  are  hoarded.  In  a  certain 
degree  this  assertion  may  be  literally  true.  But  the 
scarcity  of  gold  probably  results  chiefly  from  the  circum- 
stance  of  a  considerable  variety  of  persons,  country 
bankers,  shopkeepers,  and  others,  augmenting,  some  in a 
smaller  and  some  in  a  more  ample  measure,  that  supply 
which  it  had  been  customary  to  keep  by  them.  .  .  . It  is 
thus  that  a more  slow  circulation  of guineas  is occasioned; 
and  the  slower  the  circulation,  the  greater  the  quantity 
wanted  in  order  to  effect  the  same  number  of  money 
payments.  (H,  99-100) 
Thornton  argues  that  the  demand  for  components 
of  the  money  stock  varies  inversely  with  difference 
between  the  market  rate  of interest  and the  own  rate 
on  the  particular  component. 
Bills,  however,  and  especially  those  which  are  drawn  for 
large  sums,  may  be  considered  as  in  general  circulating 
more  slowly  than  either  gold  or  bank  notes.  .  .  .  Bank 
notes,  though  they  yield  an  interest  to  the  issuer,  afford 
none  to  the  man  who  detains  them  in  his  possession; 
they  are  to  him  as  unproductive  as  guineas.  The  posses- 
sor  of a bank  note,  therefore,  makes  haste  to  part  with  it. 
The  possessor  of a bill of exchange  possesses,  on  the  con- 
trary,  that  which  is  always  growing  more  valuable.  .  .  . 
such  part  of  the  circulating  medium  as  yields  an  interest 
to  the  holder  will  effect  much  fewer  payments,  in  pro- 
portion  to  its  amount,  than  the  part  which  yields  to  the 
holder  no  interest.  (H,  92  and  94) 
5.  Aggregate  Supply  and  Demand 
The  Transitory Nonneutrality of  Money  Before 
discussing  Thornton’s  money  supply  function,  it is 
necessary  to  discuss  his  aggregate  supply  of output 
function.  The  long-run  neutrality  of  money  incor- 
porated  into  this  latter  function  endows  Thornton’s 
general  model  with  a  natural  rate  of  interest.  As 
discussed  below,  money  supply  is a function  of the 
difference  between  the  Bank rate  and the  natural rate. 
In  Paper  Credit,  Thornton  emphasizes  the 
economic  disruption  of deflation.  A major  theme  in 
the  book  is  a  defense  of  the  suspension  of  con- 
vertibility  by the  Bank  of England  in 1797.  As noted 
in  Section  8,  Thornton  believed  that  the  terms  of 
trade  had  changed  adversely  for  Britain.  Maintain- 
ing convertibility  would,  therefore,  have  required  a 
deflation  of the  domestic  British  price  level.  Suspen- 
sion of convertibility  allowed  the  pound  to depreciate 
on  the  foreign  exchanges  without  this  deflation. 
Thornton  (H,  117-18  and  152)  admonishes  against 
deflation  as  a  corrective  to  an  adverse  balance  of 
trade.5 
5 An additional  reason  why  Thornton  favored  suspension  of the 
gold  standard  was  that  suspension  allowed  the  export  of  gold 
coin.  This  export  of gold  coin  mitigated  the  deterioration  of the 
British  terms  of  trade  (H,  153). 
Thornton  refers  briefly  to  two  reasons  why  a 
change  in the  money  stock  affects  real economic  ac- 
tivity.  One  reason  is that  wage  rates  do not  respond 
to  changes  in  prices  perceived  to  be  temporary. 
The  tendency,  however,  of  a  very  great  and  sudden 
reduction  of  the  accustomed  number  of  bank  notes  is  to 
create  an  mumal  and  temporary distress  and  a  fall  of 
price  arising  from  that  distress.  But  a  fall  arising  from 
temporary  distress  will  be  attended  probably  with  no 
correspondent  fall  in  the  rate  of  wages;  for  the  fall  of 
price,  and  the  distress,  will  be  understood  to  be  tem- 
porary,  and  the  rate  of wages,  we  know,  is not  so  variable 
as  the  price  of  goods.  [Italics  in  original]  (H,  119) 
Thornton  also suggests  that  individuals  confound 
changes  in relative  prices  with  changes  in the  price 
level. 
Probably  no  small  part  of  that  industry  which  is  excited 
by  new  paper  is produced  through  the  very  means  of  the 
enhancement  of  the  cost  of  commodities.  While  paper  is 
encreasing,  and  articles  continue  rising,  mercantile  specu- 
lations  appear  more  than  ordinarily  profitable.  The  trader, 
for  example,  who  sells  his  commodity  in  three  months 
after  he  purchased  it,  obtains  an  extra  gain,  which  is 
equal  to  such  advance  in  the  general  price  of  things  as 
the  new  paper  has  caused  during  the  three  months  in 
question:  he  confounds  this  gain  with  the  other  profits  of 
his  commerce;  and  is  induced,  by  the  apparent  success 
of  his  undertakings,  to  pursue  them  with  more  than  the 
usual  spirit.  (H,  237-38) 
.  .  .  nations  in  general  were  usually  insensible  at  first  to 
the  declension  of  the  value  of  their  circulating  medium. 
They  were  accustomed  to  experience  fluctuation  of  [their) 
exchange  [rate],  and  they  naturally  referred,  at first,  even  a 
serious  depreciation  of their  paper,  to  the  same  commer- 
cial causes  which  they  were  in the  habit  of contemplating. 
.  .  . It  was  reasonable  to  suppose  that  men  should  gener- 
ally  mistake  in  this  respect.  We  naturally  imagine  that 
the  spot  on  which  we  ourselves  stand  is  fiied  and  that 
the  things  around  us  move.  The  man  who  is  in  a  boat 
seems  to  see  the  shore  departing  from  him.  . . . In conse- 
quence  of  a  similar  prejudice,  we  assume  that  the  cur- 
rency  which  is  in  all  our  hands,  and  with  which  we  our- 
selves  are,  as  it were,  identified,  is fixed,  .  .  . whereas  in 
truth,  it  is  the  currency  of  each  nation  that  moves.  (H, 
340) 
Forced  Saving  Thornton  did  believe  that  the 
seigniorage  from  money  creation  could  redistribute 
income  in such  a way  as to increase  the  capital  stock 
and,  thereby,  to  increase  permanently  the  level  of 
economic  activity.  He  argues  that  “.  . . borrowers, 
in consequence  of that  artificial  state  of things  which 
is produced  by  the  law  against  usury,  obtain  their 
loans too  cheap”  (H,  255) from  the  Bank of England.6 
6 Thornton  claims  that  only  the  Bank  of  England  was  effec- 
tively  bound  by  the  usury  law.  A borrower  from  a regular  bank 
“bestowed  the  benefit  of. his  running  cash,”  that  is,  maintained 
compensating  balances  to  raise  the  effective  loan  rate  to  the 
market  clearing  rate.  A  borrower  in  the  money  market  “gave 
to  a broker  a small percentage  on every  bill,” that  is, paid  points 
(H,  335). 
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able to borrow  at a below  market  rate  from  the  Bank. 
Income  is redistributed  to these  individuals  and away 
from  holders  of  existing  cash  balances  and  wage 
earners  whose  wages  are  slow  to  adjust  to  inflation. 
The  proprietors of  the  new  paper  will  become  greater 
encouragers  of  industry  than  before;  the  owners  of  the 
old  paper,  being  able  to  command  less  property,  will 
have  less  power  of  employing  labour.  .  .  .  (H,  237)  It 
must  be  also  admitted  that,  provided  we  assume  an  ex- 
cessive  issue  of  paper  to  lift  up,  as  it  may  for  a  time, 
the  cost  of  goods  though  not  the  price  of  labour,  some 
augmentation  of  stock  will  be  the  consequence;  for  the 
labourer,  according  to  this  supposition,  may  be  forced  by 
his  necessity  to  consume  fewer  articles.  (H,  239) 
Long-mn  Neutrah2y of  Momy  Thornton  makes 
clear,  however,  that  the  effects  just  described  are  of 
secondary  importance.  In  the  long  run,  the  ap- 
propriate  assumption  is the  neutrality  of money  with 
regard  to  real  economic  activity. 
There  seems  to  be  only  two  modes  in  which  we  can 
conceive  the  additional  paper  to  be  disposed  of.  It  may 
be  imagined  either,  first,  to  be  used  in  transferring  an 
encreased  quantity  of articles,  which  it must,  in that  case, 
be  assumed  that  the  new  paper  itself  has  tended  to 
create;  or,  secondly,  in  transferring  the  same  articles  at  a 
higher  price.  Let  us  examine  the  first  of  these  cases.  .  .  . 
When  the  Bank  of  England  enlarges  its  paper,  it  aug- 
ments,  in  the  same  degree,  as  we  must  here  suppose,  its 
loans  to  individuals.  These  favored  individuals  immedi- 
ately  conceive,  and  not  without  reason,  that  they  have 
obtained  an  additional  though  borrowed  capital,  by  which 
they  can  push  their  own  particular  manufacture.  .  .  .  it 
does  not  occur  to  them  that  the  commerce  or  manufac- 
tures  of  other  individuals  can  be  at  all  reduced  in  conse- 
quence  of  this  encrease  of  their  own.  But,  first,  it  is 
obvious  chat  the  antecedently  idle  persons  to  whom  we 
may  suppose  the  new  capital  to  give  employ  are  limited 
in  number;  and  that,  therefore,  if  the  encreased  issue  is 
indefinite,  it  will  set  to  work  labourers  of  whom  a  part 
will  be  drawn  from  other  and,  perhaps,  no  less  useful 
occupations.  (H,  235-36) 
There  remains,  therefore,  no  other  mode  of  accounting 
for  the  uses  to  which  the  additional  supply  of  it  [Bank  of 
England  paper]  can  be  turned  than  that  of  supposing  it to 
be  occupied  in  carrying  on  the  sales  of  the  same,  or 
nearly  the  same,  quantity  of  articles  as  before,  at  an 
advanced  price,  the  cost  of  goods  being  made  to  bear  the 
same,  or  nearly  the  same,  proportion  to  their  former  cost, 
which  the  total  quantity  of  paper  at  the  one  period  bears 
to  the  total  quantity  at  the  other.  (H,  241) 
A&regate Demand and t/te Interesst  Rate  Thornton 
spends  considerable  time  discussing  the  economy’s 
aggregate  supply  function  in order  to  establish  both 
the  transitory  nonneutrality  of money  and  the  long- 
run neutrality  of money  with respect  to real economic 
activity.  He  spends  less  time  discussing  the 
economy’s  aggregate  demand  function,  apart  from 
a general  description  of  aggregate  nominal  demand 
as  dependent  upon  the  quantity  of  money  (H, 
117-18).  There  is, however,  a section  in one  of his 
speeches  before  Parliament  in  18 11 in which  he  ex- 
plains  the  relationship  between  investment  demand 
and  the  real  rate  of interest.  Thornton  first  explains 
the  relationship  between  the  real rate  of interest  and 
the  market  rate  of  interest  and  then  notes  that  in- 
vestment  demand  depends  upon  the  former  variable. 
[This  discussion  anticipated  that  of Irving  Fisher.  See 
Beranek,  Humphrey,  and  Timberlake  (1985).] 
It  was  material  to  observe  that  there  had,  since  the 
beginning  of  the  war,  been  a continual  fall  in  the  value  of 
money.  .  .  . which  was,  on  the  average,  2  or  3  per  cent. 
per  annum:  it  followed  from  hence  that  if, for  example,  a 
man  borrowed  of  the  Bank  1000  pounds  in  1800  and 
paid  it  back  in  1810  .  .  .  he  paid  back  that  which  had 
become  worth  less  by  20  or  30  per  cent.  than  it  was 
worth  when  he  first  received  it.  He  would  have  paid  an 
interest  of  50  pounds  per  annum  for  the  use  of  this 
money;  but  if from  this  interest  were  deducted  the  20  or 
30  pounds  per  annum,  which  he  had  gained  by  the  fall  in 
the  value  of  the  money,  he  would  find  that  he  had  bor- 
rowed  ac 2  or  3  per  cent.,  and  not  at  5  per  cent.  as  he 
had  appeared  to  do.  .  .  . 
. . . during  a fall in  the  price  of money  .  . . Imen]  felt  . . . 
the  advantage  of  being  borrowers.  .  .  . on  estimating  the 
value  of  those  commodities  in  which  they  had  invested 
their  borrowed  money,  they  found  that  value  to  be  con- 
tinually  increasing,  so  that  there  was  an  apparent  profit 
over  and  above  the  natural  and  ordinary  profit  on  mercan- 
tile  transactions.  This  apparent  profit  was  nominal,  as  to 
persons  who  traded  on  their  own  capital,  but  not  nominal 
as  to  those  who  traded  with  borrowed  money.  .  .  . This 
extra  profit  was  exactly  so  much  additional  advantage  .  . . 
and  was  so  much  additional  temptation  to  borrow.  Ac- 
cordingly,  in  countries  in  which  the  currency  was  in  a 
rapid  course  of  depreciation,  supposing  that  there  were 
no  usury  laws,  the  current  rate  of  interest  was  often  .  .  . 
proportionably  augmented.  (H,  335-36) 
6.  The  Supply  of  Money 
A  Central Bank  Thornton  developed  the  con- 
ception  of  a central  bank  after  observing  the  finan- 
cial panic  of  1793.  In  particular,  he  noticed  that  to 
banks  and  to  London  merchants  Bank  of  England 
notes  were  interchangeable  with gold specie  (H,  123). 
He  argues  that  in the  case  of a bank  run,  the  Bank 
of England  should  increase  its notes  in order  to  off- 
set  the  reduction  in  bank  reserves  caused  by  gold 
outflows  from  the  banking  system. 
. . . the  holder  of  a note  of  1000  pounds  .  .  . carries  it to 
the  Bank  and  demands  1000  pounds  in  gold.  The  .Bank 
gives  the  gold;  which  gold  . . . fills a void  in the  circulation 
of  the  country  occasioned  by  the  withdrawing  of  country 
bank  notes  in  consequence  of  alarm,  or  serves  as  an 
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therefore,  having  paid  away  this  1000  [pounds1  iri gold, 
and  having  received  for  it  their  own  note  for  1000 
pounds  must  now  re-issue  this  note,  if they  are  resolved 
to  maintain the  amount of  their paper  cicdath.  How, 
then,  is  the  Bank  to  issue  it? The  only  means  which  the 
Bank,  on  its  part,  is  able  to  take  for  the  extension  of  its 
paper  circulation  is to  enlarge  its  loans.  [Italics  in  original1 
W,  1.25) 
In  defending  the  Bank  of England’s  decision  in 1797 
to  suspend  convertibility,  Thornton  argues  that  the 
increase  in the  Bank’s loans that  occurred  at the  time 
was  due  to  a need  to  maintain  the  currency  in  the 
face  of an internal  drain.  The  increase  did not  cause 
the  suspension  through  overissue.  “The  largeness  of 
those  loans  was  not  the  cazlse  of  the  guineas  going 
from  them,  as has  been  ordinarily  supposed:  it was 
the  ejS&’  [Italics  in  original]  (H,  137). 
Thornton  discusses  monetary  base  creation  by the 
Bank  of England  in terms  of the  Bank’s balance  sheet 
(H,  136).  He  shows  its balance  sheet  as comprising 
credits  of bullion  and total  loans  and debits  of capital 
and deposits  plus notes.  In Thornton’s  words,  “Every 
additional  loan  obtained  by  the  Bank,  if we  suppose 
its  gold  to  remain  the  same,  implies  an  encreased 
issue  of  paper”  (H,  227). 
T?ie Bank Rate-Natural  Rate Model of th  Money 
Stppb  Central  to Thornton’s  theory  of money  stock 
determination  is the  concept  of a natural  rate  of in- 
terest,  that  is, a rate  of interest  invariant  in the  long 
run  to the  behavior  of the  money  stock.  The  follow- 
ing quotation  asserts  this  idea  as well as the  absence 
of a liquidity  effect  on the  rate  of interest  in the  long 
run. 
The  reader,  possibly,  may  think  that  an  extension  of 
bank  loans,  by  furnishing  additional  capital,  may  reduce 
the  profit  on  the  use  of  it,  and  may  thus  lessen  the  temp- 
tation  to  borrow  at  five  per  cent.  It  has  already  been 
remarked  in  this  Chapter  that  capital  by  which  term  bona 
pa%  property  was  intended  cannot  be  suddenly  and 
materially  encreased  by  any  emission  of  paper.  That  the 
rate  of  mercantile  profit  depends  on  the  quantity  of  this 
bona  fide  capital  and  not  on  the  amount  of  the  nominal 
value  which  an encreased  emission  of paper  may  give  to  it 
is  a circumstance  which  it will  now  be  easy  to  point  out. 
I  admit  that  a  large  extension  of  bank  loans  may  give  a 
temporary  check  to  the  eagerness  of  the  general  demand 
for  them.  It  will  cause  paper  to  be  for  a  time  over 
abundant,  and  the  price  paid  for  the  use  of  it,  to  fall. 
It  seems  clear,  however,  on  the  principles  already  stated, 
that  when  the  augmented  quantity  of  paper  shall  have 
been  for  some  time  stationary,  and  shall  have  produced 
its  full  effect  in  raising  the  price  of  goods,  the  temptation 
to  borrow  at  five  per  cent.  will  be  exactly  the  same  as 
before;  for  the  existing  paper  will  then  bear  only  the 
same  proportion  to  the  existing  quantity  of  goods,  when 
sold  at  the  existing  prices,  which  the  former  paper  bore 
to  the  former  quantity  of  goods,  when  sold  at  former 
prices:  the  power  of  purchasing  will,  therefore,  be  the 
same;  the  terms  of  lending  and  borrowing  must  be  pre- 
sumed  to  be  the  same.  (H,  255-56) 
According  to Thornton,  money  creation  depends 
upon  the  difference  between  the  Bank  of  England 
discount  rate  and  the  economy’s  natural  rate  of 
interest: 
It  may  possibly  be  thought  that  a  liberal  extension  of 
loans  would  soon  satisfy  all  demands  and  that  the  true 
point  at  which  the  encrease  of  the  paper  of  the  Bank 
ought  to  stop  would  be  discovered  by  the  unwillingness 
of  the  merchants  to  continue  borrowing.  In  order  to 
ascertain  how  far  the  desire  of  obtaining  loans  at  the 
Bank  may  be  expected  at  any  time  to  be  carried,  we 
must  enquire  into  the  subject  of  the  quantum  of  profit 
likely  to  be  derived  from  borrowing  there  under  the 
existing  circumstances.  This  is  to  be  judged  of  by  con- 
sidering  two  points:  the  amount  first  of  interest  to  be 
paid  on  the  sum  borrowed;  and  secondly  on  the  mercan- 
tile  or  other  gain  to  be  obtained  by  the  employment  of 
the  borrowed  capital.  .  .  .  We  may,  therefore,  consider 
this  question  as  turning  principally  on  a  comparison  of 
the  rate  of  interest  taken  at  the  Bank  with  the  current 
rate  of  mercantile  profit.  (H,  253-54) 
In  a discussion  of  an  episode  of overissue  by  the 
Bank  of France,  Thornton  provides  a statement  of 
the  condition  of monetary  equilibrium  as equality  be- 
tween  the  Bank  rate  and  the  natural  rate.’ 
The  French  government  having  occasion  in  1805  for 
some  advances  on  the  security  of  what  they  call  their 
anticipations  .  .  .  proceeded  to  discount  at  the  Bank  as 
many  securities  as  were  sufficient  to  supply  their  occa- 
sions.  .  .  .  The  consequence  of  this  transaction  was  an 
7 In constructing  this  framework,  Thornton  needed  to work  out 
the  interrelationships  between  the  markets  for  capital,  credit, 
and  the  money  stock  and  the  simultaneous  determination  of the 
rate  of  interest  among  these  markets.  Money  stock  creation 
permitted  a transitory-divergence  between  the  market  rate  on 
bank  loans  and  the  natural  rate  on  real  capital.  The  originality 
of Thornton’s  framework  can  be  seen  through  a comparison  to 
the  state  of  interest  rate  theory  at  the  time  of  the  publication 
of Pa5er Credit.  Schumoeter  (1954.  720)  notes  the  dominance 
of Adam  Smith’s  view  that  the‘markkt  rate of interest  was merely 
a reflection  of  the  rate  of  return  yielded  by  the  capital  stock. 
There  was  no  mechanism  for  the  money  stock  to  influence  the 
market  rate. 
Thornton’s  model  became  the  basis  for  the  loanable  funds 
model  of  interest  rate  determination  used  by  neoclassical 
economists.  It  seems  likely  that  his  model  was  transmitted  to 
the  neoclassical  economists  by  J.  S.  Mill  in  his  priircip/es  text. 
See.  for  examole.  the  discussion  in  Mill  (1865.  645-47).  The 
vergion  employed  by  the  neoclassical  economists,  however, 
lacked  the  forcefulness  of  Thornton’s  model  because  it 
dropped  the  idea  of  a central  bank  with  the  ability  to  expand 
the  monetary  base.  At  the  center  of Thornton’s  model  was  the 
concept  of  a modern  central  bank,  that  is,  a  bank  capable  of 
controlling  the  monetary  base  through  bookkeeping  operations. 
As  noted  in  the  introduction,  this  concept  was  not  again 
developed  in  a  significant  fashion  until  Keynes. 
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of  their  cash  followed;  the  diligences  were  found  to  be 
carrying  off  silver  into  the  departments.  .  .  .  The  circu- 
lating  medium  of  the  metropolis  had  now  plainly  become 
excessive.  .  .  .  the  French  over-issue  arose  from  an 
attempt  to  turn  certain  securities  into  cash  at  a  rate  of 
interest  lower  than  that  which  was  the  natural  one.  .  .  . 
(H,  337  and  339) 
In assessing  the  usefulness  of the  quantity  theory 
framework,  the  central  issue is the  direction  of causa- 
tion  between  the  money  stock  and  the  price  level. 
“The  reader  possibly  may  think  that,  in treating  of 
this  subject,  I have  been  mistaking  the  effect  for the 
cause,  an  encreased  issue  of  paper  being,  in  his 
estimation,  merely  a consequence  which  follows  a 
rise  in the  price  of goods,  and  not  the  circumstance 
which  produces  it”  (H,  197-98).  In  Thornton’s 
analytical  framework,  where  the  money  stock  is en- 
dogenously  determined,  the  money  stock  and  the 
price  level  are  simultaneously  determined.  The 
analytical  usefulness  of  the  quantity  theory  then 
becomes  an  issue  of  identification.  If  differences 
exist  in the  determinants  of the  supply  and  demand 
functions  for  nominal  money,  then  the  equation  of 
exchange,  which  provides  for  a compartmentaliza- 
tion  of factors  affecting  the  supply  and  the  demand 
for  money,  is a useful  device  in understanding  the 
determination  of  the  price  level. 
In Thornton’s  framework,  nominal  money  supply 
depends  upon  the  difference  between  the  market  rate 
(the  loan  rate  of the  banking  system)  and the  natural 
rate.  Money  demand,  in contrast,  depends  upon  the 
level  of  the  market  rate.  Given  the  Bank  discount 
rate,  which  determines  the  market  rate,  real  shocks 
produce  different  movements  in money  supply  and 
demand. 
The  example  Thornton  uses  to illustrate  this point 
involves  an exogenous  decision  by  foreign  investors 
to  repatriate  temporarily  capital  from  Britain.  As  a 
result  of  their  actions,  the  demand  for  public  debt 
falls  and  the  accompanying  depreciation  of the  real 
exchange  rate  stimulates  exports.  At the  given  Bank 
discount  rate,  credit  demands  at banks  increase  and 
the  money  supply  increases  (H,  257).  Nothing  has 
happened,  however,  to increase  real money  demand, 
which  depends  upon  real  variables  like  the  interest 
rate  and real income  that  are ultimately  independent 
of  the  money  stock.  In  consequence,  the  different 
changes  in  nominal  money  supply  and  nominal 
money  demand  produced  by  a  real  shock  must 
ultimately  be  reconciled  by  a  change  in  the  price 
level. 
Gmtrodof  Counny Bank Cimkztion  Thornton  com- 
pletes  his  model  of  money  stock  determination  by 
showing  that  the  note  circulation  of the  country  banks 
rested  on the  base  of the  note  circulation  of the  Bank 
of  England.8  He  applies  Hume’s  price-specie-flow 
mechanism  to  England  considered  as  two  regions 
(London  and the  country)  with  fixed  exchange  rates 
(between  Bank  of  England  notes  and  country  bank 
notes).  Given  a fixed  Bank  of England  note  circula- 
tion,  country  banks  could  not  overissue  their  notes 
without  producing  a balance  of payments  deficit  that 
would  drain  their  reserves  in  gold  and  Bank  of 
England  notes.9 
. . . let  it be  admitted,  for  a moment,  that  a country  bank 
has  issued  a  very  extraordinary  quantity  of  notes.  We 
must  assume  these  to  be  employed  by  the  holders  of 
them  in  making  purchases  in  the  place  in  which  alone 
the  country  bank  paper  passes,  namely,  in  the  surround- 
ing  district.  The  effect  of  such  purchases  .  .  .  must  be  ;a 
great  local  rise  in  the  price  of  articles.  But  to  suppose  a 
great  and  merely  local  rise  is  to  suppose  that  which  can 
never  happen  or  which,  at  least,  cannot  long  continue  to 
exist;  for  every  purchaser  will  discover  that  he  can  buy 
commodities  elsewhere  at  a cheaper  rate;  and  he  will  not 
fail  to  procure  them  in  the  quarter  in  which  they  are 
cheap,  and  to  transport  them  to  the  spot  in  which  they 
are  dear  for  the  sake  of  the  profit  on  the  transaction.  .  .  . 
he  will,  therefore,  require  to  have  his  country  bank  note 
turned  into  a  Bank  of  England  note.  (H,  208-9) 
7.  The  Responsibility  of the Bank  of England 
to  Limit  Bank  Liabilities 
In arguing  that  the  Bank  of England  controlled  the 
note  issue  of the  banking  system  and  that  the  Bank 
should  recognize  an  explicit  responsibility  for  this 
control,  Thornton  was  challenging  adherents  of the 
real  bills view.  This  view  derives  its intuitive  appeal 
from  the  association  of  money  creation  with  credit 
creation  in a fractional  reserve  system.  A real bill was 
an  IOU  given  to  a seller  of  goods  by  a middlernan 
who  purchased  the  goods  for  resale  at  a later  date. 
In order  to receive  immediate  payment,  the  original 
seller  of  the  goods  would  take  the  IOU,  the  trade 
bill,  and  discount  it  at  a  bank,  that  is,  sell  it  at  a 
discount  from  the  face  value  that  reflected  the 
*  When  Thornton  wrote,  the  only  bank  whose  notes  circulated 
in  London  was  the  Bank  of  Eneland.  Outside  of  London,  the 
notes  of the  country  banks  circ;ated.  The  country  banks  .held 
Bank  of  England  notes  and  gold  as  reserves. 
9 The  nominal  exchange  rate  between  country  bank  notes  and 
Bank  of England  notes  equals  the  product  of the  real  exchange 
rate  between  the  commodities  of the  country  and  the  London 
area  and  the  ratio  of the  price  levels  between  these  two  areas. 
With  the  nominal  exchange  rate  between  these  two kinds  of notes 
fixed,  and  given  the  real  exchange  rate,  the  Bank  of  England 
determined  the  price  level  in  the  country  by  setting  the  price 
level  in the  London  area  through  the  control  of its  note  circula- 
tion.  Given  the  price  level  in  the  country,  the  note  issue  of 
country  banks  was  determined. 
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from  the  bank  promising  to pay  gold  or legal  tender 
on  demand.  When  the  middleman  resold  the  goods 
to the  ultimate  purchasers,  he would  pay  off the  IOU 
note,  and  the  total  quantity  of  bank  notes  would 
return  to  its  original  level.  Bank  notes  arising  from 
these  transactions  were  then  viewed  as  self- 
liquidating.  From  the  real  bills  perspective,  bank 
notes  arising  from  the  discounting  of  real  bills  are 
instruments  of  credit  extension.  Their  quantity  is 
limited  by  the  real  credit  demands  of the  commer- 
cial  sector.  Thornton  summarized  this  view  as 
follows: 
The  encrease  of  Bank  of  England  paper  .  .  . is  the  effect 
and  not  the  cause  of  an  advanced  price  of  commodities. 
To  enlarge  the  Bank  of  England  notes  merely  in  propor- 
tion  as  safe  and  real  bills  are  offered  in  return  for  them  is 
only  to exchange  one  species  of paper  for another,  namely, 
Bank  of  England  notes  for  bills,  which,  though  not  so 
current  or  so  safe  as  Bank  notes,  are  sufficiently  worthy 
of  credit.  It  is,  therefore,  simply  to  afford  a  guarantee  to 
the  transactions  of  the  merchant  and  thus  to  render  that 
accommodation  to  commerce  which  it  belongs  to  the 
Bank  to  give.  (H,  230-31) 
Real  bills proponents  argued  furthermore  that,  if cur- 
rency  were  overissued,  it  would  not  remain  in  cir- 
culation,  but  rather  would  be  used  to pay  off loans. 
[See  Humphrey  (1982)  on  the  real  bills principle.] 
Thornton  uses  his Bank-rate  natural-rate  model  of 
money  stock  determination  to  refute  the  real  bills 
view  “that  the  Bank  paper  has  a  natural  tendency 
sufficiently  to limit itself’  (H,  232).  In his model,  the 
central  bank  must  target  some  nominal  variable  like 
the  exchange  rate  in  order  to  ensure  equality  be- 
tween  the  Bank  rate  and  the  natural  rate  and  thus 
to provide  for  a well-defined  money  stock  and  price 
level.  He  provides  his most  succinct  criticism  of the 
real  bills view  in a criticism  of John  Law.  Thornton 
argues  that  the  real  bills  assumption  that  an excess 
supply  of  currency  will produce  a reduction  in  the 
quantity  of  currency  through  a liquidation  of  bank 
loans fails to understand  the  price  level  as a monetary 
phenomenon.  An  excess  supply  of  currency  can 
create  its  own  demand  through  a rise  in  the  price 
level. 
He  [Law]  forgot  that  there  might  be  no  bounds  to  the 
demand  for paper;  that  the  increasing  quantity  would  con- 
tribute  to  the  rise  of  commodities;  and  the  rise  of  com- 
modities  require,  and  seem  to  justify,  a  still  further 
increase.  (H,  342) 
In  parts  of  Paper  Credit, Thornton  argues  that 
because  a  variety  of  factors  could  cause  shifts  in 
velocity,  there  would  be  no  simple  relationship  be- 
tween  the  money  stock  and  the  price  level.  In order 
that  his  discussion  not  be  misconstrued,  however, 
he  also emphasizes  that  variability  in the  public’s  de- 
mand  for money  in no way reduces  the  responsibility 
of  the  Bank  of  England  to  provide  for  an  explicit 
limitation  on  the  quantity  of  money  in  order  to 
preserve  a well-defined  price  level. 
But  although  there  is  so  great  difficulty  in  estimating  the 
precise  influence  on  the  cost  of  articles,  or  on  the  market 
price  of  bullion,  which  each  alternation  in  the  quantity  of 
Bank  of  England  notes  may  produce,  there  is  no  reason, 
on  that  account,  to  doubt  the  general  truth  of  the  propo- 
sition  .  .  . that  the  restriction  of  the  paper  of  the  Bank  of 
England  is  the  means  both  of  maintaining  its  own  value, 
and  of  maintaining  the  value,  as  well  as  of  limiting  the 
quantity,  of  all  the  paper  in  the  country.  (H,  225) 
8.  The  International  Adjustment  Mechanism 
Assuming  the  operation  of the  international  gold 
standard,  Thornton  extends  the  price-specie-flow 
mechanism,  which  as exposited  by  Hume  had  dealt 
only  with  exogenous  changes  in  the  money  stock, 
to  deal  with  real  disturbances  and  the  consequent 
monetary  repercussions.  [See  Viner  (1924)  and 
(1937).]  Thornton  also presents  the  first  discussion 
of  the  operation  of  floating  exchanges  rates  in  the 
context  of the  relationship  between  the  internal  and 
external  value  of  the  pound. 
InternationaL G/d  Standard  Thornton  begins 
his  exposition  with  an  explanation  of  the  self- 
equilibrating  character  of the  balance  of payments. 
The  condition  of flow  equilibrium  in the  trade  sec- 
tor  is  derived  from  the  need  for  stock  equilibrium 
in  the  market  for  money  and  securities. 
It  may  be  laid  down  as  a general  truth  that  the  commer- 
cial exports  and  imports  of a state  . . . naturally  proportion 
themselves  .  .  . and  that  the  balance  of  trade  .  .  . cannot 
continue  for  a very  long  time  to  be  either  highly  favorable 
or  highly  unfavorable  to  a country.  For  that  balance  must 
be  paid  in  bullion  or  else  must  constitute  a debt.  To  sup- 
pose  a  very  great  balance  to  be  paid,  year  after  year,  in 
bullion  is  to  assume  such  a  diminution  of  bullion  in  one 
country,  and  such  an  accumulation  of it in  another,  as are 
not  easily  imagined.  . . . To  suppose  large  and  successive 
balances  to  be  formed  into  a  debt  is  to  assume  an 
accumulation  of  debt  which  is  almost  equally  incredible. 
(H,  141-42) 
Thornton  also derives  aggregate  balance  in the foreign 
trade  sector  from  the  budget  constraints  of individuals 
(Perlman  (1986)]. 
There  is  in  the  mass  of  the  people,  of  all  countries,  a 
disposition  to  adapt  their  individual  expenditure  to  their 
income.  Importations  . .  . are  limited  by  the  ability  of  the 
individuals  of  that  country  to  pay  for  them  out  of  their 
income.  .  .  . And  this  equality  between  private  expendi- 
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equality  between  the  commercial  exports  and  imports. 
(H,  142-43) 
Under  the  assumption  of  fixed  exchange  rates, 
Thornton  examines  the  effects  of foreign  remittances 
to  subsidize  continental  governments  fighting 
Napoleon  and  of bad  harvests  on the  British  balance 
of payments.  Although  not  clearly  stated,  his  argu- 
ment  is that  the  resulting  balance  of payments  deficit 
will  cause  the  domestic  price  level  to  fall  and  the 
foreign  price  level  to  rise.  The  deterioration  in the 
real  terms  of  trade,  that  is,  the  rise  in  the  price  of 
foreign  commodities  in  terms  of  domestic  com- 
modities,  will  eliminate  the  deficit  (H,  14.5). 
Thornton  criticizes  the  antibullionist  position  that 
“The  evil  of  an  unfavorable  foreign  exchange,  and 
of  a  consequent  high  price  of  gold,  arises  from  an 
unfavorable  balance  of trade  and from  that cause  only” 
(H,  230-31).  That  is,  Thornton  criticizes  the  anti- 
bullionist  position  that  exchange  rate  movements 
were  due  solely  to  the  behavior  of  excess  demand 
and  supply  in  the  foreign  trade  sector.  Thornton 
argues  that  excess  demand  in  the  trade  sector  and 
excess  supply  in the  market  for the  quantity  of money 
are reflections  of each  other.  In the  case  of real  sec- 
tor  shocks,  like poor  harvests,  the  direction  of causa- 
tion  runs  from  excess  demand  in the  trade  sector  to 
excess  supply  in  the  market  for  money. 
I  conceive,  therefore,  that  this  excess  [of  paper],  if  it 
arises  on  the  occasion  of  an  unfavorable  balance  of  trade, 
and  at  a  time  when  there  has  been  no  extraordinary 
emission  of  notes,  may  fairly  be  considered  as  an  excess 
created  by  that  unfavourable  balance.  (H,  151) 
In  the  case  of  excess  issue  of  the  currency,  a 
monetary  shock,  the  direction  of causation  runs from 
excess  supply  in the  market  for the  quantity  of money 
to  excess  demand  in  the  trade  sector. 
“the  coming  and  going  of  gold”  does  not  .  .  .  “depend 
wholly  on  the  balance  of  trade.”  It  depends  on  the  quan- 
tity  of  the  circulating  medium  issued;  or  it  depends,  as  I 
will  allow,  on  the  balance  of  trade,  if  that  balance  is 
admitted  to  depend  on  the  quantity  of circulating  medium 
issued.  (H,  248) 
Fhctiathg  ,!Gdunge Rates  Thornton  presents  the 
purchasing  power  parity  doctrine  according  to  which 
fluctuating  exchange  rates  will vary  in order  to main- 
tain constant  the  terms  of trade  when  domestic  price 
levels  change. 
. . . as  goods  are  rendered  dear  in  Great  Britain  .  .  .  our 
exports  will  be  diminished;  unless  we  assume  .  .  .  that 
some  compensation  in  the  exchange  is  given  to  the 
foreigner.  . . . our  imports  also will encrease.  . . . these  two 
effects  .  .  . will  follow  provided  that  we  suppose,  what  is 
not  supposable,  namely,  that,  at  the  time  when  the  price 
of  goods  is  greatly  raised  in  Great  Britain,  the  course  of 
[the]  exchange  suffers  no  alteration.  .  .  .  The  fall  in  the 
selling  price  abroad  of  bills  payable  here  will  operate  as 
an  advantage  to  the  foreign  buyer  of  our  commodities  in 
the  computation  of  the  exchangeable  value  of  that  circu- 
lating  medium  of  his  own  country  with  which  he  dis- 
charges  the  debt  in  Britain  contracted  by  his  purchase. 
It  will  thus  obviate  the  dearness  of  our  articles:  it  will 
serve  as  compensation  to  the  foreigner  for  the  loss  which 
he  would  otherwise  sustain  by  buying  in  our  market.  (H, 
198-99) 
Thornton  argues  that  a floating  exchange  rate  would 
maintain  equality  between  exports  and  imports, 
although  account  had  to be  made  for  desired  capital 
flows  (H,  246-47). 
Thornton  constructed  the  analytical  apparatus  of 
Paper  Cre&  in  order  to  deal  with  the  bullionist- 
antibullionist  debate  over  the  cause  of  the  depreci- 
ation  of  the  pound  on  the  foreign  exchanges.  This 
debate  turned  on  whether  the  depreciation  of  the 
foreign  exchange  value  of  the  pound  following 
Britain’s  suspension  of the  gold  standard  was  a real 
or  a monetary  phenomenon.  Under  convertibiliry, 
the  Mint  had coined  one  ounce  of gold  into  3 pounds 
17  shillings  10 % pence.  In  1801,  the  pound  price 
of gold  rose  above  this former  mint  price.  Bullionists 
argued  that  the  excess  of the  market  price  over  the 
mint  price  of bullion was due to the  Bank of England’s 
excess  issue  of its notes.  That  is, an increase  in the 
money  stock  had  led  to  a rise  in the  price  level  and 
also to  a rise  in the  price  of the  specific  commodity, 
gold  bullion.  Because  Napoleonic  Europe  was  on  a 
gold  standard,  the  pound  price  of  gold  bullion  was 
the  British  exchange  rate.  Thornton  believed  that  the 
rise  in the  price  of gold  bullion  reflected  a deteriora- 
tion  in  Britain’s  real  terms  of  trade.  What  is of  en- 
during  interest,  however,  is not  Thornton’s  specific 
position  in this  debate,  but  rather  his  development 
of an analytical  framework  general  enough  to explain 
changes  in  the  exchange  rate  as  either  a  real  or  a 
monetary  phenomenon. 
Thornton’s  argument  in  support  of  his  position  that 
the  depreciation  of the pound  was a real phenomenon 
possesses  two  parts.  The  first  part  is the  presumed 
absence  of  monetary  disturbances.  At  the  time 
Thornton  lived,  the  idea  of an index  number  had  not 
been  invented,  and  there  were  no  indexes  for  the 
price  level.  In  the  absence  of  evidence  on  the 
behavior  of the  price  level,  Thornton’s  argument:  for 
the  absence  of  monetary  disturbances  turns  on  the 
other  variables  in  the  equation  of  exchange:  1) the 
money  stock,  2)  velocity,  and  3)  real  transactions. 
1) In support  of their  position,  the  bullionists  pointed 
to an increase  in Bank  note  issue  between  1797  and 
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the  increase  in Bank  notes  from  1795  to  1801  just 
offset  the  reduction  in the  circulation  of gold  guineas 
following  the  Restriction  (H,  214).  These  guineas 
had  been  exported  when  gold  coin  ceased  to  cir- 
culate.  That  is, according  to Thornton,  the  monetary 
base had  remained  unchanged.  2) Thornton  does  ad- 
mit  that  the  velocity  of money  had  increased  due  to 
technological  change  in  the  payments  industry, 
especially  in the  form  of clearing  houses  to facilitate 
check  clearing  among  banks  (H,  101  and  222). 
3) Thornton  then  claims,  however,  that  the  growth 
in  British  trade  abroad  that  accompanied  the  con- 
tinental  wars  had  increased  real  transactions  in 
Britain  by  enough  to  offset  the  effect  on  prices  of 
the  rise  in  velocity  (H,  221-23). 
The  second  part  of Thornton’s  argument  is that, 
while  monetary  disturbances  appeared  to be absent, 
there  were  obvious  real disturbances  that  could  have 
affected  the  real  exchange  rate,  especially,  the  oc- 
currence  of  two  successive  poor  harvests  that  had 
increased  British  imports  of food  (H,  225).  Finally, 
Thornton  points  out  that  the  transitory  nature  of the 
shocks  affecting  the  terms  of  trade  would  in  time 
allow  for  resolution  of the  dispute  over  the  cause  of 
the  depreciation  of  the  pound  on  the  foreign  ex- 
changes.  If the  depreciation  were  real,  then  the  tran- 
sitory  nature  of  these  real  shocks  would  imply  the 
reversal  of  the  pound’s  depreciation  (H,  221). 
9.  The  Bullion  Committee  Report 
Early  in  1809,  the  gold  bullion  price  of the  pound 
fell sharply  in Britain.  Under  convertibility,  the  Mint 
had  made  123 ‘/4  grains  of gold  interchangeable  with 
one  pound  sterling.  In  1809,  only  107 grains  of gold 
were  required  to buy  a pound.  On  February  1, 18 10, 
Francis  Horner,  in the  House  of Commons,  moved 
to  form  The  Select  Committee  on  the  High  Price 
of  Bullion.  Its  report,  issued  on  June  8,  1810, 
accuses  the  Bank of England  of depreciating  the value 
of  the  pound  on  the  foreign  exchanges  through 
overissue  of  its  notes. 
T/re Anti&%onist  Addends  With  Napoleonic 
Europe  on the  gold  standard,  the  pound  price  of gold 
bullion  measured  the  exchange  rate  between  Britain 
and  Europe.  The  antibullionists  argued  that  the  rise 
in the  price  of bullion  reflected  a deterioration  of the 
balance  of  payments.  They  carried  their  argument 
further  by  contending  that  the  real  bills  policy 
precluded  the  possibility  that  the  note  issue  of  the 
Bank of England  could  affect  the  exchange  rate.  With 
a real  bills  policy,  it  was  argued,  an  excess  supply 
of  Bank  notes  could  not  arise. 
The  Bank  Directors  .  .  .  professed  themselves  to  be 
most  thoroughly  convinced  that  there  can  be  no  possible 
excess  in the  issue  of Bank  of England  paper,  so  long  . . . 
as  the  discount  of  mercantile  Bills  is  confined  to  paper  of 
undoubted  solidity,  arising  out  of  real  commercial  trans- 
actions,  and  payable  at  short  and  fixed  periods.  (C,  46) 
Mr.  Whitmore,  the  late  Governor  of  the  Bank,  expressly 
states,  “The  Bank  never  forces  a Note  in  circulation,  and 
there  will  not  remain  a Note  in  circulation  more  than  the 
immediate  wants  of  the  public.  .  .  .  The  Bank  Notes 
would  revert  to  us  if  there  was  a  redundancy  in  circula- 
.tion,  as  no  one  would  pay  interest  for  a  Bank  Note  that 
he  did  not  want  to  make  use  of.  (C,  47) 
According  to the  antibullionists,  because  there  could 
be  no  excess  supply  of  money,  there  could  be  no 
relationship  between  the  note  issue  of the  Bank  and 
the  value  of the  pound  on the  foreign  exchanges.  Mr. 
Pearse,  Governor  of the  Bank  of England,  testified: 
In  considering  this  subject  with  reference  to  the  manner 
in  which  Bank  notes  are  issued,  resulting  from  the  appli- 
cations  made  for  discounts  to  supply  the  necessary  want 
of  Bank  notes,  by  which  their  issue  in  amount  is  so  con- 
trolled  that  it  can  never  amount  to  an  excess,  I  cannot 
see  how  the  amount  of  Bank  notes  issued  can  operate 
upon  the  price  of  Bullion,  or  the  state  of  the  Exchanges. 
62,  33) 
The Bdionist  Rebuttal  The  Bullion  Committee 
noted  first  that  exchange  rate  movements  can  have 
a real,  as well  as a nominal,  component  (C,  22,  24, 
and  26).  Its  members  also  recognized  the 
reasonableness  of the  position  that  the  real  terms  of 
trade  had  depreciated.  Its  members,  however,  did 
not  recognize  the  validity  of the  antibullionist  argu- 
ment  that  the  real  bills  principle  of  the  Bank  of 
England  precluded  the emergence  of an excess  supply 
of money  that  could  depreciate  the value of the pound 
in the  foreign  exchange  market.  The  Bullion  Com- 
mittee  argued  that  the  Bank  Directors  did not  under- 
stand  how  suspension  of the  gold  standard  removed 
the  institutional  mechanism  for  determining  the 
nominal  quantity  of money.  The  real  bills  principle 
did  not  provide  for  an  appropriate  check  on  the 
money  stock  because  it determined  the  note  circula- 
tion  on  the  basis  of  credit  demands. 
SO  long  as  the  paper  of  the  Bank  was  convertible  into 
specie  at  the  will  of  the  holder,  it  was  enough,  both  for 
the  safety  of  the  Bank  and  for  the  public  interest  in  what 
regarded  its  circulating  medium,  that  the  Directors 
attended  only  to  the  character  and  quality  of the  Bills  dis- 
counted,  as  real  ones  and  payable  at  fixed  and  short 
periods.  .  .  .  It  was  hardly  to  be  expected  of  the 
Directors  of  the  Bank  that  they  should  be  fully  aware  of 
the  consequences  that  might  result  from  their  pursuing, 
after  the  suspension  of  cash  payments,  the  same  system 
which  they  had  found  a  safe  one  before.  (C,  48-49) 
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as  a check  to  an  over  issue  of  paper,  the  Bank  Directors 
have  not  perceived  that  the  removal  of  that  check 
rendered  it  possible  that  such  an  excess  might  be  issued 
by  the  discount  of  perfectly  good  bills.  .  .  .  That  this 
doctrine  is  a very  fallacious  one,  Your  Committee  cannot 
entertain  a  doubt.  The  fallacy  upon  which  it  is  founded 
lies  in not  distinguishing  between  an  advance  of  capital  to 
Merchants  and  an  additional  supply  of  currency  to  the 
general  mass  of  circulating  medium.  (C,  50) 
Finally,  the  Bullion  Committee  argued  that,  given 
the  usury  law existing  in Great  Britain,  only  explicit 
rationing  of use  of the  discount  window,  not  the  real 
bills principle,  would  limit  the  money  stock  (C,  57). 
In  the  absence  of an  index  of the  price  level,  the 
Bullion  Committee  argued  indirectly  that  the  exter- 
nal depreciation  of the  pound  was caused  to a signifi- 
cant  degree  by overissue  of Bank  notes.  In particular, 
the  Committee  argued  that  both  the  money  stock 
and the velocity  of money  had increased.  Its estimates 
of  the  money  stock  showed  a  significant  increase 
beginning  in  1809  (C,  62ff .).  The  Committee 
members  used  two  arguments  to  show  that  the  ve- 
locity  of money  had increased.  First,  they  argued  that 
velocity  depends  positively  upon  the  state  of  con- 
fidence  in private  credit  and that  this  confidence  was 
high.  Second,  Committee  members  argued  that 
technological  innovation  in the  payments  industry, 
in  particular,  the  spread  of  checks  and  of  clearing 
houses,  had  increased  velocity. 
10.  The  Committee’s  Conclusions 
The  Bullion  Committee  concluded  that  the 
depreciation  of the  pound  on  the  foreign  exchanges 
was  primarily  due  to  overissue  by  the  Bank  of 
England.  Its members  argued  that  during  the  suspen- 
sion  of the  gold  standard  the  behavior  of the  foreign 
exchange  rate  should  serve  as a criterion  for  setting 
the  quantity  of  money.  The  Committee  also  drew 
the  more  fundamental  conclusion  that  Parliament 
should  put  in place  some  institutional  arrangement 
for providing  a limitation  on the  nominal  quantity  of 
money  (C,  4.5 and  49). 
The  Bullion  Committee  rejected  a  discretionary 
approach  to  monetary  policy.  It  argued  that  discre- 
tionary  adjustment  of  the  money  stock  to  changes 
in the  public’s  demand  for  money  was  insurmount- 
ably  difficult. 
The  suspension  of  Cash  payments  has  had  the  effect  of 
committing  into  the  hands  of  the  Directors  of  the  Bank 
of  England,  to  be  exercised  by  their  sole  discretion,  the 
important  charge  of supplying  the  Country  with  that  quan- 
tity  of  circulating  medium  which  is  exactly  proportioned 
to  the  wants  and  occasions  of the  Public.  In  the  judgment 
of the  Committee,  that  is a trust,  which  it is unreasonable 
to  expect  that  the  Directors  of  the  Bank  of  England 
should  ever  be  able  to  discharge.  The  most  detailed 
knowledge  of  the  actual  trade  of  the  Country,  combined 
with  the  profound  science  in  all  the  principles  of  Money 
and  Circulation,  would  not  enable  any  man  or  set  of  men 
to  adjust,  and  keep  always  adjusted,  the  right  proportion 
of  circulating  medium  in  a country  to  the  wants  of  trade. 
.  .  .  If  the  natural  system  of  currency  and  circulation  be 
abandoned,  and  a discretionary  issue  of paper  money  sub- 
stituted  in  its  stead,  it  is  vain  to  think  that  any  rules  can 
be  advised  for  the  exact  exercise  of  such  a  discretion. 
(C,  52-53) 
The  Bullion  Committee  recommended  the  return 
to the  international  gold  standard.  This  standard  dic- 
tates  a country’s  domestic  price  level.  The  quantity 
of gold  a country  demands  at  the  given  price  level 
is then  provided  through  the  balance  of payments. 
When  the  currency  consists  entirely  of  the  precious 
metals,  or  of  paper  convertible  at  will  into  the  precious 
metals,  the  natural  process  of  commerce,  by  establishing 
Exchanges  among  all the  different  countries  of  the  world, 
adjusts,  in  every  particular  country,  the  proportion  of  the 
circulating  medium  to  its  actual  occasions,  according  to 
that  supply  of  the  precious  metals  which  the  mines  fur- 
nish  to  the  general  market  of  the  world.  (C,  52-53) 
The  Bullion Committee  also defined  for the gold stan- 
dard  the  different  response  of  a  central  bank  ap- 
propriate  to  an internal  drain  and  an external  drain. 
It  appears  to  Your  Committee  that  the  experience  of  the 
Bank  of  England  in  the  years  1793  and  1797,  contrasted 
with  the  facts  which  have  been  stated  in  the  present 
Report,  suggests  a distinction  most  important  to  be  kept 
in view  between  that  demand  upon  the  Bank  for  Gold  for 
the  supply  of  the  domestic  channels  of  circulation, 
sometimes  a  very  great  and  sudden  one,  which  is  occa- 
sioned  by  a  temporary  failure  of  confidence,  and  that 
drain  upon  the  Bank  for  Gold  which  grows  out  of  an 
unfavourable  state  of the  Foreign  Exchanges.  The  former, 
while  the  Bank  maintains  its  high  credit,  seems  likely  to 
be  best  relieved  by  a judicious  increase  of accommodation 
to  the  Country:  the  latter  .  ,  .  ought  to  suggest  to  the 
Directors  a  question  whether  their  issues  may  not  he 
already  too  abundant.  (C,  60) 
11.  Summary 
In  order  to  address  the  policy  issue  of  the  cause 
of the  depreciation  of the  pound  on  the  foreign  ex- 
changes,  Thornton  created  an  enduring  analytical 
framework.  The  framework  is of a general  equilibrium 
nature  and  demonstrates  the  relationship  between 
the  internal  and  external  value  of  money  under 
fixed  and floating  exchange  rates.  The  framework  is 
capable  of  distinguishing  real  from  monetary 
phenomena.  In particular,  Thornton  could  use  it to 
consider  changes  in the  exchange  rate  that  were  both 
real  and  monetary  in origin.  Thornton’s  framework 
contains  an  aggregate  supply  function  that  allowed 
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long-run  neutrality  of  money.  In  his later  speeches, 
Thornton  also  sketched  out  an  aggregate  demand 
function  dependent  upon  the  real  rate  of  interest. 
Thornton’s  model  is a natural  rate  model,  that  is, real 
variables  are unaffected  by  the  systematic  actions  of 
monetary  policy.  (An  exception,  of  a second-order 
of  magnitude,  is made  for  the  distributional  effects 
due  to  the  seigniorage  from  money  creation.) 
Thornton  created  a quantity  theory  framework  that 
could  incorporate  paper  money,  the  fiduciary  issue 
of  a  fractional-reserve  banking  system.  He  had  a 
sophisticated  theory  of the  demand  for  real  money 
that  made  the  velocity  of  the  components  of  the 
money  stock  vary  with  the  difference  between  the 
market  rate  of interest  and  the  own  rate  on  the  par- 
ticular  component.  The  supply  of  nominal  money 
depends  upon  the  difference  between  the  market  rate 
and the  natural  rate  of interest.  Because  the  interest 
rate  enters  in differently  in the  supply  and  demand 
schedules  for  nominal  money,  real  sector  shocks 
affect  these  schedules  differently.  Because  the  real 
variables  that  affect  real money  demand  are only  tran- 
sitorily  related  to the  nominal  money  stock,  the price 
level  must  adjust  to  equilibrate  shifts  in the  supply 
and  demand  schedules  for  nominal  money. 
Thornton  developed  the  idea  of a modern  central 
bank  that  exercises  control  over  all the  liabilities  of 
commercial  banks.  Monetary  base  creation  by  the 
Bank  of  England  makes  possible  the  transitory 
divergence  between  the  natural  and  market  rate  of 
interest  that  leads  to  money  creation.  A recurrent 
theme  in Thornton’s  work  is the  responsibility  of the 
Bank  of England  to provide  for  explicit  limitation  of 
the  monetary  base  in  order  to  ensure  a  well- 
defined  money  stock  and  price  level.  During  times 
of financial  panic  and  bank  runs,  this  responsibility 
requires  the  Bank of England  to expand  the  monetary 
base  in order  to  maintain  the  money  stock.  Thorn- 
ton  summarizes  his policy  prescriptions  in the  follow- 
ing  passage: 
To  limit  the  total  amount  of  paper  issued,  and  to  resort 
for  this  purpose,  whenever  the  temptation  to  borrow  is 
strong,  to  some  effectual  principle  of  restriction;  in  no 
case,  however,  materially  to  diminish  the  sum  in  circula- 
tion,  but  to  let  it  vibrate  only  within  certain  limits;  to 
afford  a  slow  and  cautious  extension  of  it,  as  the  general 
trade  of  the  kingdom  enlarges  itself;  to  allow  of  some 
special,  though  temporary,  encrease  in  the  event  of  any 
extraordinary  alarm  or  difficulty,  as  the  best  means  of 
preventing  a  great  demand  at  home  for  guineas;  and  to 
lean  to  the  side  of  diminution,  in  the  case  of  gold  going 
abroad,  and  of  the  general  exchanges  continuing  long 
unfavorable;  this  seems  to  be  the  true  policy  of  the 
directors  of  an  institution  circumstanced  like  that  of  the 
Bank  of England.  To  suffer  either  the  solicitations  of mer- 
chants,  or  the  wishes  of  government,  to  determine  the 
measure  of  the  bank  issues,  is  unquestionably  to  adopt  a 
very  false  principle  of  conduct.  (H,  259) 
12.  Concluding  Comment 
The  major  theme  in Henry  Thornton’s  An &+v&v 
into the Natum ad  Effects of the Paper Credit of &eat 
Britain is the  central  bank’s  responsibility  for  deter- 
mining  the  money  stock  and  the  price  level.  The 
major  theme  of the  Bdbon Report  is that  this  respon- 
sibility  should  be  made  explicit  and  that  the 
mechanism  chosen  for  determining  the  price  level 
should  not  be  a  matter  of  ongoing  discretion.iO 
The  ideas  of  Henry  Thornton  continue  to 
challenge  the  monetary  policymaker  today.  Although 
it is now recognized  that  the  Federal  Reserve  System 
bears  the  responsibility  for the  behavior  of the  price 
level,  the  procedure  for  determining  it over  time  is 
not explicitly  enunciated.  The  basic issue is what  kind 
of anchor  the  monetary  authority  should  provide  for 
nominal  values.  Should  this anchor  remain  fast in the 
sand  so  that  the  wind  of  real  sector  and  monetary 
shocks  moves  the  ship  of nominal  economic  values 
around  permanent  moorings  such  as  price  level 
stability?  Alternatively,  should  this anchor  drag across 
the  sand  so that  the  wind of real sector  and monetary 
shocks  moves  the  ship  of nominal  values  randomly 
away  from  any  given  location? 
To  repeat,  two  basic  approaches  to  determining 
the  price  level  over  time  are possible.  One  approach 
would  precommit  to a long-run  path for the price  level 
and consistently  provide  for some  constraint  on each 
period’s  decision  making  in order  to  assure  that  over 
time  the  price  level  moves  around  the  given  long- 
run  path.  The  other  approach,  which  is the  current 
one,  allows  the  price  level  to  evolve  on  an  ongoing 
basis through  the  accumulation  of discretionary  deci- 
sions  made  each  period  so  that  the  price  level 
wanders  over  time  without  any fixed  point  of return. 
Although  close  to two  hundred  years  old, Thornton’s 
work  continues  to challenge  the  modern  policymaker 
to defend  the  institutional  procedures  chosen  to an- 
chor  the  nominal  values  of  the  economic  system. 
lo These  two  themes  are repeated,  respectively,  in Black (1986) 
and  Black  (1987).  On  the  latter  issue,  see  Broaddus  and  Good- 
friend  (1984). 
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